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Executive Summary 
Enforcement has been identified as one of the most critical issues concerning 
Canadian capital markets stakeholders. Effective enforcement by regulators is critical to 
achieving the policy objectives underlying securities regulation. However, public 
enforcement is only one part of a comprehensive enforcement strategy, which includes 
private enforcement through the courts and other mechanisms as well as investor 
education initiatives.  
Part of the divisiveness surrounding the contemporary debate on regulatory 
enforcement in Canada appears to be related to the disconnect between securities 
regulators and investors in interpreting the mandate of investor protection. While 
regulators exercising their powers of enforcement have generally interpreted their 
mandate as forward looking and grounded in principles of deterrence, aggrieved investors 
are most interested in being made whole as a result of capital markets misconduct.  The 
time may be ripe to re-conceive of the role of the securities regulator in the 21st century 
as one that, in addition to taking enforcement actions on the basis of the principle of 
deterrence, also acts as a catalyst or facilitator to assist investors in receiving 
compensation for harms suffered in the capital markets.  
The threat of criminal prosecution can act as a real and significant deterrent to 
regulated market participants. However, Criminal Code prosecutions should be reserved 
for the most egregious cases of capital markets misconduct. As such, the Integrated 
Market Enforcement Team’s (IMET) strategy of expending significant resources on a 
very small number of investigations is a reasonable and appropriate one. However, the 
goals underlying the creation of IMET are unlikely to come to fruition unless appropriate 
attention is also paid to the role of the judiciary in the criminal law process.  Historically, 
judges have imposed nominal fines on corporate offenders that can be written off as a 
cost of doing business. Judges should be provided with greater context-training and 
education so that they recognize and appreciate the magnitude and impact of corporate 
misconduct on large segments of the population, and the broader ramifications of capital 
markets crimes on the Canadian economy. Serious consideration should also be given to 
the creation of specialized courts for Criminal Code offences related to capital markets 
wrongdoing and quasi-criminal charges under provincial securities laws.   
Securities regulators need to structure the broad discretion that has been 
afforded to them so that they have a principled, rational and justifiable basis on which to 
pursue their enforcement agendas and activities. The recent events at the Alberta 
Securities Commission underscore the need for a disciplined enforcement system that has 
clear enforcement policies, guidelines and standards, as well as consistency in 
enforcement processes and appropriate analysis and reasoning to support conclusions and 
recommendations on files. To the extent that some Canadian securities regulators have 
not done so already, they should be encouraged to create, justify and publicly disclose the 




Effective enforcement requires a high-level of co-operation, co-ordination and 
communication among Canadian securities regulators. The current regulatory structure 
would benefit from greater co-ordination and co-operation in relation to enforcement 
policy-setting and priority-setting. A system should be devised to recognize sanctions 
imposed by one securities commission in other Canadian jurisdictions. In this regard, a 
national commission or consolidated regulator would enhance enforcement effectiveness 
by allowing for policies and priorities to be set at a national level. Sanctions would also 
be more consistent and effective across the country. Attention should also be paid to 
technical and policy issues related to co-operation and co-ordination with foreign 
jurisdictions, particularly regulators in the U.S. 
  
Canadian securities regulators should continue to collect and disseminate data 
on raw inputs and outputs to the public: size of enforcement staff and budgets, the 
number of files opened and closed and the number of hearings and settlements. However, 
greater effort should be made to analyze the impact of enforcement inputs and outputs on 
the actual behaviour of regulated market participants. 
 
Investor perceptions about Canada’s enforcement effectiveness relative to 
other jurisdictions, in particular the U.S., are important and need to be addressed, in light 
of the increased mobility of capital in today’s global economy. In comparing Canadian 
and U.S. data on enforcement, one needs to take into account differences in statutory 
authority afforded to the securities regulators as well as practical differences in the 
handling of cases. Canadian securities regulators should educate the investors, the press 
and the public about these differences but at the same time consider adopting best 
practices and policies from other jurisdictions to the extent that they may enhance 








Enforcement has been identified as one of the most critical issues concerning 
Canadian capital markets stakeholders today. Investors vehemently make the case that 
there is insufficient enforcement activity, that the small investor is not well protected, that 
the commissions have been captured by those they regulate, and that the self-regulatory 
organizations (SROs) are unable to engage in effective enforcement because of perceived 
or actual conflicts. Meanwhile, market participants, such as registrants, issuers, officers, 
and directors, and well as gatekeepers to securities markets, complain that enforcement 
by regulators is “out of control.”  They argue that there is too much enforcement activity 
taking place, and that the governance structures at the commissions and the SROs create 
conflicts to their detriment. 
 
Effective enforcement by regulators is critical to achieving the policy 
objectives of securities regulation, most often cited as protecting investors, enhancing the 
efficiency of the capital markets and maintaining a high level of public confidence in the 
markets.   
 
These policy goals are achieved through a variety of instruments and a range of 
institutions. In the context of the Canadian capital markets, relevant institutions include 
the provincial securities regulators and SROs such as the Investment Dealers Association 
(IDA), the Mutual Fund Dealers Association (MFDA) and Regulation Services (RS). 
Municipal, provincial and federal law enforcement agencies, the attorneys-general, and 
the judiciary are also important institutions.   For the purposes of this paper, all of these 
institutions are labelled “regulators” even though it is acknowledged that there are 
significant differences among them.   
 
Securities regulation focuses on numerous classes of people or entities that are 
involved in the capital markets, including issuers, directors, officers, registrants and 
gatekeepers, such as auditors and lawyers. For the purposes of this paper, all of these 
parties are labelled “regulated market participants” even though there are significant 
differences amongst the market participants in terms of the instruments that are used to 
regulate them. 
 
This paper focuses on the fundamental principles underlying effective 
enforcement by regulators.  In particular, this paper analyzes the critical role of the 
criminal law and judges in effectively addressing capital markets misconduct.  It also 
                                                 
* The research assistance of Sultana Yusufali, Carmen Choi, and Anna Tennenbaum is gratefully 
acknowledged. Thanks are owed to the Capital Markets Institute and in particular to Paul Halpern, Doug 
Harris and Atanaska Novakova in conceiving of this timely project and for their continued input and 
support. Thanks are also owed to all participants at the CMI Roundtable and CMI Conference for insightful 
comments and suggestions.   Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the CMI Roundtable in 
December 2004, a Faculty Workshop at the University of Windsor, Faculty of Law in February 2005, the 
Business Law at the Border Conference at the Canada-America Research Centre of the University of 
Windsor Faculty of Law in June 2005, and a CMI Conference in June 2005. 
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analyzes how securities regulators can best structure the wide discretion that is afforded 
to them in designing enforcement strategies and policies that are effective, fair, 
transparent and accountable.  This study also examines the current allocation and division 
of enforcement responsibilities in respect of the capital markets amongst the numerous 
entities involved and explores contentious issues related to the current overlapping and 
concurrent jurisdiction. Finally, this study examines the issue of data and in particular, 
data comparisons on enforcement effectiveness with the United States.   
 
This paper focuses on the regulatory enforcement stage and does not address 
issues related to non-compliance by regulated market participants as a result of poor rule-
making or instrument design by regulators. However, there may be a variety of reasons at 
the rule design stage that may lead to latter non-compliance by regulated market 
participants.1 For example, compliance with the rule may be too costly or complex, the 
transition time may be too short, the rules may be too inflexible, or the market 
participants may not have been consulted prior to it being created.2  
 
Part 2 of this paper briefly establishes the link between the policy objectives of 
securities regulation and enforcement activity. Part 3 analyzes the role of public 
enforcement in a comprehensive enforcement strategy and considers whether public 
regulators should play a role in facilitating private enforcement.  Part 4 sets out the theory 
of the regulatory pyramid and applies its underlying principles to determine the 
appropriate role of the criminal law, sanctions and judges.  Part 5 analyzes issues related 
to structuring the broad discretion afforded to securities regulators. Part 6 highlights some 
of the most critical issues arising from the current overlapping structure of enforcement 
in Canada. Part 7 analyzes issues related to collecting data on enforcement activities and 
comparing enforcement effectiveness with other jurisdictions, in particular the United 
States. Part 8 concludes. 
 
 
2. Relationship between Enforcement and the Policy Objectives of Securities 
Regulation 
 
Following the corporate governance scandals and accounting improprieties of 
recent past, and the passage of the Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002 in the United States, 
Canadian capital markets stakeholders engaged in a vigorous debate on the appropriate 
Canadian regulatory response. As a result, we witnessed a flood of substantive securities 
law reform, in areas including auditor independence,3 director independence,4 the role 
                                                 
1 Reducing the Risk of Policy Failure: Challenges for Regulatory Compliance, Organization for Economic 
Co-Operation and Development [OECD Report].  
2 Ibid.  
3 See, for example, National Instrument 52-108 Auditor Oversight. 
4 See, for example, National Instrument 58-101 Disclosure of Corporate Governance Practices and National 
Policy 58-201 Corporate Governance Guidelines.  
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and composition of the audit committee,5 and CEO/CFO certification of financial 
disclosure.6   
The federal government also focused its efforts on enhancing investor 
confidence in the Canadian capital markets by creating Integrated Market Enforcement 
Teams (IMET) across the country as well as new Criminal Code offences of insider 
trading, tipping and whistleblower retaliation.7  The federal government is also 
considering amendments to the Canada Business Corporations Act (CBCA) to heighten 
corporate governance requirements.8   
 
However, this recent regulatory reform is meaningless unless it is accompanied 
by compliance from the regulated market participants and effective enforcement by 
regulators.  Empirical studies show that strong enforcement activity is correlated with 
enhanced investor confidence and a reduced cost of capital.9 Equally as important as the 
substantive legal rules on the books is actual compliance with them by regulated market 
participants and their enforcement.   
 
 
3. The Appropriate Role of Public Enforcement in a Comprehensive Enforcement 
Strategy 
 
The main criticisms of enforcement activity in Canada have focused on public 
enforcement by securities regulators and SROs.  However, a comprehensive enforcement 
strategy entails not only effective enforcement by public regulators but also private 
enforcement mechanisms that allow investors who are injured by capital markets 
wrongdoing to seek redress.  A comprehensive enforcement strategy also includes 
preventive measures and investor education programs.  
 
It is beyond the scope of this paper to explore in detail issues related to private 
enforcement but it is an extremely important aspect of compliance and enforcement. In 
fact, some recent studies have concluded that the strength of private enforcement 
mechanisms is actually more important than public enforcement mechanisms in 
achieving the underlying policy objectives of securities regulation.10 To this end, 
                                                 
5 See, for example, Multilateral Instrument 52-110 Audit Committees and Companion Policy 52-110.   
6 See Multilateral Instrument 52-109 Certification of Disclosure in Issuers’ Annual and Interim Filings and 
Companion Policy 52-109; See also Proposed Multilateral Instrument 52-111 – Reporting on Internal 
Control Over Financial Reporting: Canada’s Response to s.404 of Sarbanes-Oxley; for a critique of 
proposed 52-111, see National Post (May 25, 2005) where Domenic D’Allessandro, CEO, Manulife 
Financial Corporation states that SOX s.404 is “extraordinarily onerous” and will “cost an estimated $30 
million CDN per year to implement.”  
7 An Act to Amend the Criminal Code (Capital Markets Fraud and Evidence Gathering) Third Session, 
Thirty-Seventh Parliament, 52-53 Elizabeth II, 2004 (Bill C-13).  
8 Towards An Improved Standard Of Corporate Governance For Federally Incorporated Companies: 
Proposals For Amendments To The Canada Business Corporations Act (Industry Canada, Ottawa). 
9 See, for example, Bhattacharya & Daouk “The World Price of Insider Trading” (200?) 57 Journal of 
Finance 75. 
10 Rafael LaPorta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes and Andrei Shlieifer, “What Works in Securities Laws.” 
(June 11, 2004) Available at 
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effective private enforcement mechanisms should allow for timely and cost-effective 
adjudication or resolution of meritorious claims but have sufficient thresholds and 
procedures in place to prevent frivolous and vexatious claims. Recent developments in 
Canada such as class actions legislation and contingency fees have a favourable impact 
on the effectiveness of private enforcement by aggrieved investors through the court 
system. The Ontario government’s announcement that amendments to the Securities Act 
(Ontario), introducing statutory civil liability for misrepresentations in continuous 
disclosure documents and failure to make timely disclosure, which will be brought into 
force on December 31, 2005, is a welcome development in this regard.  The IDA’s 
arbitration program and the Financial Services Ombudsman should also be evaluated to 
determine if they are meeting their intended policy objectives.  
 
Part of the divisiveness that surrounds the contemporary debate on 
enforcement in Canada appears to be related to the disconnect between securities 
regulators and investors in interpreting the mandate of investor protection. Regulators 
have historically interpreted their mandate as forward-looking and deterrence-based. 
Various legal decisions have certainly underscored that the role of the securities regulator 
is protective and preventive, not remedial, compensatory or punitive.11  However, 
individual investors who have lost their savings due to the misconduct of regulated 
market participants are most interested in being compensated. They conceive of the 
securities regulator’s role in protecting investors as helping them to be made whole and 
they are interested in seeing securities regulators play a greater role in facilitating 
compensation for their losses. 
 
It may very well be time to re-conceive of the role of the securities regulator in 
the 21st century, as one that not only takes forward-looking actions, but also one that acts 
as a facilitator or catalyst to assist investors in receiving compensation. While some 
securities commissions, including the OSC, do already have statutory powers to apply to 
the court for restitution or compensation orders, the OSC, for example, has only done so 
once.12 Further study should be undertaken on reasons why securities regulators have not 
historically made use of this provision, and securities commissions should be encouraged 
to use this power more frequently. Serious further consideration should also be given to 
                                                                                                                                                 
http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/rafael.laporta/working_papers/WhatWorksInSecuritiesLaws/s
ecurities06112004complete.pdf (Last accessed: November 27, 2005). But see also Robert Yalden, 
“Legislative Deference and Canadian Securities Regulators: Lessons from the Debate on Civil Liability for 
Continuous Disclosure” (Working Draft dated October 19, 2004, on file with author), in which he argues 
that expanded private enforcement and in particular statutory civil liability for continuous disclosure is not 
as necessary in Canada as it may have been even a few years ago in light of the recently expanded 
resources and powers of public securities regulators.  
11 See Committee for the Equal Treatment of Asbestos Minority Shareholders v. Ontario (Securities 
Commission) [2001] 2 SCR 132; See also Re Albino (1991), 14 OSCB 365; See also Re Mithras 
Management Ltd. (1990), 13 OSCB 1600.  
12 Five Year Review Committee Final Report: Reviewing the Securities Act (Ontario) (March 21, 2003). 
Available at: http://www.osc.gov.on.ca/Regulation/FiveYearReview/fyr_20030529_5yr-final-report.pdf. 
(Last accessed November 27, 2005).    
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allowing securities commissions the ability to order restitution or compensation under 
their public interest power.13   
 
 
4. The Regulatory Pyramid: The Role of the Criminal Law, Sanctions and Judges 
 
Compliance is optimized by regulation that is contingent, 
co-operative, tough and forgiving.14
 
Studies in various regulatory settings show that compliance is best achieved 
when regulators have available to them a range of enforcement sanctions, strategies and 
approaches.15 The basic principle is that “softer”, less harsh approaches should be used 
more frequently and before tougher, more severe approaches are considered.   
 
The availability of and possible application of tougher, more severe 
approaches will act as a deterrent for most market participants and propel them to 
comply.  Actual, frequent application of tough approaches is not necessary and may lead 
to overall greater non-compliance. This approach is characterized by a regulatory 
pyramid which suggests that regulators should use good will, co-operation and persuasion 
to achieve compliance before resorting to harsher, stricter sanctions.   
 
(i) The Appropriate Role of the Criminal Law   
 
Based on the principles underlying the regulatory pyramid, sanctioning options 
should be tiered from the most compliance/deterrence based to the most punitive.  Most 
cases of non-compliance should be dealt with by attempting to get regulated market 
participants who are not abiding by the rules to do so.  In the context of the misconduct in 
the Canadian capital markets, it is appropriate that securities commissions rely 
significantly on their public interest powers to pursue administrative sanctions with a 
focus on deterrence.  Securities commissions also have available to them quasi-criminal 
sanctions through the court system but have not historically made use of them. There has 
been a bit more interest in using this route recently, but nonetheless securities 
commissions should be encouraged to use this channel more frequently.   The criminal 
                                                 
13 See the Five Year Committee Final Report, Ibid, Recommendation 75:  
We recommend that the Commission monitor the exercise by the Manitoba Securities 
Commission and the FSA of their new restitution powers and consider the practical implications 
of the exercise of this power, with a view to revisiting in the future whether a power to order 
restitution would be an appropriate remedy for the Commission. 
 
 
14 I. Ayres and J. Braithwaite, (1992), Responsive Regulation: Transcending the Deregulation Debate, 
Oxford University Press, New York. 
15 See OECD Report, supra note 1; See also J. Braithwaite and T. Makkai, “Trust and Compliance” 4 
(1994) Policing and Society; B.Fisse and J. Braithwaite, Corporations, Crime and Accountability, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993); Malcolm Sparrow, The Regulatory Craft, (Brookings 
Institute Press, 2000). 
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law, at the apex of the regulatory pyramid, should be used sparingly. In my opinion, 
Criminal Code prosecutions should be reserved for only the most egregious cases of 
capital markets misconduct and should be used as a last resort of recalcitrant offenders.  
 
Historically, very few capital markets prosecutions have been pursued by 
criminal law authorities and even fewer have been successful. This was largely the result 
of a lack of resources, and a perceived or actual lack of interest and expertise on the part 
of the various entities involved: law enforcement agencies, crown attorneys, and judges.  
Capital markets offences are complex, involve multiple actors, and are often more 
difficult to prove than traditional crimes. Unlike most traditional criminal law matters, the 
resources of the defendant can parallel the government’s resources. There are also the 
theoretical and doctrinal difficulties and complexities of imposing criminal liability on 
corporate wrongdoers.16  
 
On the issue of resources, Superintendent John Sliter, the Director of IMET, 
wrote in his 1994 masters of business administration thesis at Simon Fraser University 
that competition for resources between police services is a problem, noting that “the 
policy relating to payment of confidential sources providing information with respect to 
multimillion-dollar securities frauds is basically the same for payments to persons for 
providing information on break-and-enter offences.''17
 
In an effort to enhance investor confidence and sustain Canada’s economic 
growth, the federal government committed up to $120 million in late 2002 to create 
IMET.18  By doing so, the federal government signalled its intent to more effectively use 
the criminal law power as a tool to combat capital markets misconduct. The 
interdisciplinary teams, which include RCMP investigators, lawyers and forensic 
accountants, are “dedicated to the investigation and prosecution of serious Criminal Code 
of Canada capital markets fraud offences that are of national significance and involve 
actions by publicly-traded companies with sufficient market capitalization to pose a 
genuine threat to investor confidence in Canada’s capital markets and economic stability 
in Canada.”19 There are currently six IMET teams across the country: three in Toronto 
and one in each of Vancouver, Calgary and Montreal.  
 
Has IMET been effective in achieving its mandate? It is simply too early to 
tell, given that most of their files are still under investigation and investigations are not 
                                                 
16 See, for example, the discussion in P.Puri, “Sentencing the Criminal Corporation”, (2001) 39 OHLJ 611. 
But see also An Act to Amend the Criminal Code (Criminal Liability of Organizations), 2nd Session, 37th 
Parliament, 51-52 Elizabeth II, 2002-2003. (Bill C-45) which changes the doctrinal basis of corporate 
criminal liability in Canada. 
17 “The Mounties (very often) get their man; But do 'Dudleys' do right by the investor?” Investment News 
May 23, 2005. 
18 “The IMETs help fulfill a commitment made in the 2002 Speech from the Throne and Budget 2003 to 
spend up to $120 million over the next five years to boost investor confidence in Canadian financial 
markets and sustain Canada’s economic growth.” See http://www.rcmp-
grc.gc.ca/news/2003/n_0351_e.htm. (Last accessed November 27, 2005). 
19 See http://www.rcmp.ca/fio/imets-faq_e.htm (Last accessed November 25, 2005). 
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generally disclosed to the public. As of May 2005, IMET had at least 33 investigations 
ongoing (7 active investigations and 26 somewhat less serious probes) involving public 
companies with a total market value exceeding $55 billion.20 Investigations that are on-
going and have been made public involve Nortel and Royal Group Technologies.21 It was 
also recently announced that the Vancouver IMET is investigating the possibility of 
criminal conduct at the Alberta Securities Commission.22   
 
IMET has only recently laid its first significant charges in June 2005 on former 
senior executives of Betacom under section 380 of the Criminal Code.23  The Toronto 
IMET investigation began in March 2004 as a result of a referral from the OSC, which 
means it took 15 months to complete the investigation and lay charges, exceeding 
IMET’s self-imposed 12 month guideline on completing investigations.  
 
If it turns out that IMET significantly exceeds its own guidelines on a large 
number of its investigations, appropriate policy changes should be made. IMET could 
simply adjust its guideline upwards to 15 months or 18 months, for example, but such a 
change would be counter-intuitive, particularly because public perceptions about 
enforcement effectiveness are very much tied to the length of time that it takes to bring a 
matter to resolution. An alternative approach would be for IMET to pursue fewer files so 
that there are more resources available for each file. However, given that 33 files are 
currently being investigated by IMET, of which only 7 are active, there is not much room 
left to reduce the number of files. The most viable alternative may be to increase the 
resources available to IMET so that it can better meet its guidelines and complete 
investigations in a timely manner, if it in fact turns out that it is regularly exceeding its 
own guidelines.   
 
IMET claims that it has a unique approach to enforcement in that it targets 
individuals as opposed to corporate entities. Superindent John Sliter, Director of IMET, 
stated: "We take a different approach [than] some other enforcement units in other 
countries, who may tend to go after the whole company. We concentrate more on 
individuals.''24  Part of the rationale for targeting individuals in the context of criminal 
investigations may be because of the historic difficulty in attaching criminal liability to 
the corporate entity. Another rationale is that individuals who are convicted of criminal 
offences can be imprisoned whereas organizations cannot; they are generally only fined. 
An area worthy of further study and policy analysis would be whether targeting 
individuals or organizations in criminal and regulatory proceedings leads to better 
deterrence and more effective enforcement overall.  
 
                                                 
20 “Police report 33 current investigations into Canadian financial crimes”, Canadian Press NewsWire May 
18, 2005.   
21 Investment News, supra note 17. 
22 “RCMP to follow up on alleged tainted investigations at ASC,” Globe and Mail, November 26, 2005. 
23 See Former Betacom Executives Charged With Accounting Fraud. Available at: http://www.rcmp-
grc.gc.ca/on/press/2005/2005_jun_14b_e.htm (Last accessed November 25, 2005). 
24 Supra note 17.   
 11
 
Along with creating IMET, the federal government also introduced significant 
legislative changes to the Criminal Code.  Bill C-13 creates new Criminal Code offences 
of improper insider trading and whistle-blower retaliation.25  Insider trading was 
previously an offence contained only in provincial securities laws.  Bill C-13 also 
provides greater investigative powers for law enforcement agencies to compel documents 
from third parties. It also increases maximum penalties for existing fraud offences from 
10 years to 14 years and provides greater guidance for judges at the sentencing stage.  
 
Do the creation of IMET and the amendments to the Criminal Code mean that 
the percentage of criminal prosecutions will or should increase significantly?  In my 
view, we should ensure that the proportions do not increase significantly. Based on the 
regulatory pyramid theory, the threat or possibility of criminal sanctions has sufficient 
deterrent value for most offenders and frequent resort to the criminal law will not be 
required.    
 
There are also some practical and pragmatic reasons as to why the criminal law 
should be reserved for the exceptional case. The burden of proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt in the criminal context is much higher than the burden required under, for example, 
an administrative hearing pursued by a securities commission. As well, significant 
constitutional rights are triggered in criminal investigations and proceedings, and it is 
much more onerous to gather evidence and make a case in court relative to a regulatory 
proceeding.  The recent developments discussed above should allow the small portion of 
cases that are selected to be investigated and prosecuted through the criminal route to be 
more successful. 
  
(ii)  Judges and Sanctions  
 
As discussed above, the criminal law is at the apex of the regulatory pyramid. 
Criminal law sanctions should be considered when the regulated market participant has 
acted with intent or in bad faith.  If a criminal conviction is obtained, the sanction 
imposed by the courts should reflect the severity of the misconduct and fact that the 
criminal channel was used as a last resort.  
 
Historically, however, sanctions imposed by judges on corporate and capital 
markets offenders have been disappointingly light. They are often nominal fines that can 
be written off by the offenders as a cost of doing business. Existing studies reveal that 
white collar offenders are less likely to be imprisoned, receive lower average sentences 
and serve less time than offenders in relation to traditional crimes.26   
                                                 
25 An Act to Amend the Criminal Code (Capital Markets Fraud and Evidence Gathering) Third Session, 
Thirty-Seventh Parliament, 52-53 Elizabeth II, 2004. (Bill C-13). 
26 See for example, Criminal Corporation, supra note 16, at 621. See also Laureen Snider, “Abusing 
Corporate Power: The Death of a Concept” in S.C.Boyd, D.E. Chunn & R. Menzies, eds., [Ab]using 
Corporate Power: The Canadian Experience (Halifax: Fernwood, 2001). See also D.D. Graham Reynolds, 
“Observations on Sentencing in ‘White Collar’ and ‘Blue Collar’ Fraud Cases” (Federal Prosecutors’ 




There is a general perception among the public, including members of the 
judiciary, that capital markets misconduct is victimless and that financial crimes are not 
as serious as other criminal offences that cause physical harm.27  The reality is that 
corporate and white collar crime is not victimless. The harms caused by corporate 
misconduct can result in substantial injury to a broad range of stakeholders, as witnessed 
by the recent corporate governance scandals and accounting frauds.  
 
The Canadian judiciary needs to recognize not only the magnitude and impact 
of corporate misconduct on large segments of the population, but also the broader 
ramifications of corporate crime on the Canadian economy. At the sentencing stage, 
judges also need to better understand and apply economic theory in determining the 
appropriate sanctions for corporate offenders. Judges need to better understand the 
expected cost-benefit model of economic wrongdoing and impose fines that better 
approximate the benefit of non-compliance.28 Fines need to be large enough that it should 
be a net loss for wrongdoers to engage in wrongdoing.  
 
Assume that a company gains $100 by non-compliance with a statutory 
provision. In light of scarce public resources, we cannot realistically expect to detect and 
prosecute all corporate misconduct, so assume that the probability of enforcement is 25%, 
such that one out of every four acts of this violation is detected and successfully 
prosecuted. If the company is convicted of the offence and a judge imposes a fine of 
$100, it still remains profitable for the company to engage in this misconduct in the 
future. In fact, for every four times the company engages in the misconduct, it would gain 
$400 but only pay out a fine of $100. This simple example illustrates that fines need to be 
large enough to make it a net loss for wrongdoers to engage in misconduct, but this has 
generally not been the approach taken by the judiciary in setting fines.29  
 
In addition to fines, more creative sanctions such as probation orders, remedial 
orders, forfeiture and administrative penalties need to be considered and used more 
frequently. Judges should also consider longer imprisonment terms for individuals 
convicted of capital markets misconduct to enhance the general deterrent value of their 
sanctions.  
 
Canadian judges currently have wide discretion at the sentencing stage. U.S.-
style sentencing guidelines could remove much of the latitude that judges have at the 
sentencing stage.  However, a more appropriate approach, in my view, would be to 
provide more guidance to judges about the factors that are relevant at sentencing in 
corporate and white collar crime cases, combined with greater judicial education and 
training sensitizing them to the relevant issues. Bill C-13 does, in fact, provide additional 
                                                 
27 See for example, T.David Evans, Francis Cullen and Paula Dubeck, “Chapter 4: Public Perceptions of 
Corporate Crime” in Understanding Corporate Criminality (New York: Garland Publishing Inc., 1993).  
28 See, Criminal Corporation, supra note 16. 
29 See, Criminal Corporation, supra note 16. 
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guidance to judges on sentencing by reminding them that they have the discretion to 
impose harsher sentences in the presence of specified aggravating factors, including:30  
 
(a) The value of the fraud committed exceeded one million dollars;  
(b) The offence adversely affected, or had the potential to adversely affect, the 
stability of the Canadian economy or financial system or any financial 
market in Canada or investor confidence in such a financial market;  a 
fraud exceeding $1 million, or if the offence adversely affects investor 
confidence or the stability of the Canadian economy;  
(c) The offence involved a large number of victims; or  
(d) In committing the offence, the offender took advantage of the high regard 
in which the offender was held in the community.  
 
However, it is unlikely that many Canadian judges have the expertise to 
determine whether an offence adversely affects investor confidence or the stability of the 
Canadian economy.  In our system of criminal justice, much of the responsibility for 
ensuring that judges can meaningfully interpret and apply relevant provisions lies on the 
prosecutors and defence lawyers who appear before the courts, and there may be a need 
for expert witnesses to be called to speak to these issues. However, it is also critical that 
judges receive broader context training and education that allows them to better 
appreciate the nature of corporate wrongdoing and its deleterious effect on investors as 
well as other stakeholders and the economy. Bodies such as the National Judicial Institute 
and the Canadian Institute for the Administration of Justice are well positioned to make 
available seminars and training workshops on corporate and white collar crime.  
 
Serious consideration should also be given to developing specialized courts to 
deal with capital markets offences. Given that the criminal route should be used in a very 
small portion of cases involving corporate misconduct, it may be very efficient and 
effective for a small group of judges to develop and nurture a specialized expertise in 
hearing cases involving corporate and white collar crime offenders.31 There is certainly 
precedent in Canada for criminal courts dedicated to particular types of offences or 
groups of offenders. These include Youth Courts32 and Specialized Drug Treatment 
Courts Program.33  Outside of the criminal context, some provinces have established 
specialized family courts at the superior court level to deal exclusively with certain 
                                                 
30 Bill C-13, section 380.1(1)(a)-(d). 
31 See also submission of Joe Oliver, President of the IDA, to the Legislative Assembly of Ontario, First 
Session, 38th Parliament, Official Report of Debates (Hansard) (Wednesday 18 August 2004) Page F-928.  
 
The IDA also believes there is inadequate enforcement of criminal laws that deal 
with corporate and white collar fraud. We simply cannot allow Canada to 
acquire a reputation as a haven for white-collar crime. That is why we identified 
the need for dedicated criminal courts for the prosecution of white-collar crimes. 
  





family law matters, including divorce and property claims.34 The Commercial List in 
Ontario, although not a specialized court per se, has also been very successful.  
 
The goals underlying recent federal government initiatives, including Bill C-13 
and the creation of IMET, are much more likely to come to fruition if appropriate 
attention is paid to the critical role of judges at the sentencing stage in the criminal law 
process. The historic reluctance of securities commissions to pursue quasi-criminal 
sanctions through the courts should also be countered by a well-defined strategy that 
allows judges to better appreciate the nuances of capital markets misconduct and impose 
sentences that give sufficient consideration to the principle of general deterrence.35  
 
 
5. Structuring the Discretion of Enforcement Departments 
 
At a general level, the enforcement departments of securities commissions, 
SROs and other regulators have quite similar structures. There are multiple sources of 
complaints, including those from members of the public, referrals from securities 
commissions, SROs, law enforcement agencies and other regulatory bodies, as well as 
internally generated complaints from within the entity. The complaints are summarized 
and additional preliminary documentation is obtained if necessary. The file is then: (i) 
moved along to investigation for further evidence collection; (ii) closed as no further 
action is warranted; or (iii) referred to another entity as appropriate.  
 
In investigations, investigators locate additional documentation (that is either 
voluntarily produced or compelled if the regulator has statutory or contractual powers to 
do so) and witnesses, including those who may be the subject of the investigation, are 
interviewed. A decision is then made to (i) move the file to litigation; or (ii) close the file 
for insufficient evidence.     
 
In litigation, the file is first prepared for (i) a settlement and if one is not 
forthcoming, then (ii) a contested hearing. Most matters settle but settlement agreements 
must be approved before the relevant securities commission or a hearing panel.  
 
Clearly, not all complaints received can make it to litigation. Some files will 
simply not have sufficient evidence to move them forward so they must be closed. The 
more difficult and challenging issue is which file(s) should be chosen when there is 
enough evidence to move multiple files forward. How should regulators distinguish 
                                                 
34 Ibid. 
35 In the Andrew Rankin insider trading case, the trial judge imposed a six month sentence. The OSC 
recently filed a Notice of Appeal arguing that the sentence is “demonstrably unfit” and that it does not give 
proper consideration to the principle of general deterrence. See, Press Release: OSC Appeals Sentence in 
the Andrew Rankin Matter, November 25, 2005, available at 
http://www.osc.gov.on.ca/About/NewsReleases/2005/nr_20051125_osc-rankina.jsp. See also Notice of 
Appeal, available at http://www.osc.gov.on.ca/Enforcement/Proceedings/2005/rad_20051125_rankina.pdf 
(Last accessed November 27, 2005).   
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between different types of misconduct, issuers and registrants, and different types and 
amounts of harm caused?   
 
Given limited resources, securities regulators need to structure the broad 
discretion that has been afforded to them so that they have a principled, rational and 
justifiable basis on which they pursue their enforcement agendas and activities. The 
recent events at the Alberta Securities Commission underscore the need for a disciplined 
enforcement system that has clear enforcement policies, guidelines and standards, as well 
as consistency in enforcement processes and appropriate analysis and reasoning to 
support conclusions and recommendations on files.36
 
Regulatory bodies worldwide are moving towards risk-based regulation.37  
Depending on the regulator in question, factors that may be relevant in targeting certain 
market participants over others include the size of the regulated market participant, 
previous violations, whether or not the market participant has internal compliance 
systems in place, the capital base of the firm, and the experience and ability of 
management.38    
 
The OSC has publicly released a Staff Notice outlining its risk-based approach 
to enforcement.39 The OSC has indicated that, as a general matter, it will pursue those 
matters that cause the “greatest harm to the integrity of Ontario’s capital markets taking 
into account successful resolution and resources required to achieve such an outcome.”40
 
The theme of resources appears to be central to the risk-based approach 
outlined by the OSC.   In deciding whether to pursue a matter, the regulator will consider 
the quantum of resources required to achieve a successful outcome and whether few 
additional resources would be required to bring the matter to a successful resolution. A 
factor suggesting that the regulator should not take jurisdiction is where “an extra-
ordinary commitment of resources would be required, disproportionate to the conduct in 
question,”41 the Commission is less likely to pursue enforcement action against such a 
matter. Unlike in other regulatory contexts, regulated market participants in the capital 
markets may very well have resources that match or outdo the regulator in responding to 
a possible enforcement action, and as such, consideration of this factor in an individual 
                                                 
36 See Report of the Auditor General on the Alberta Securities Commission’s Enforcement System 
(October 2005). Available at: 
http://www.oag.ab.ca/html/Report%20of%20the%20AG%20on%20ASC%20enforcement%20systems.pdf 
(last accessed November 27, 2005). 
37 OECD Report, supra note 1. 
38 Ibid.  
39 OSC Staff Notice 11-719, A Risk Based Approach for More Effective Regulation (2002), 25 OSCB 
8410. See also Susan Wolburgh Jenah,  A Risk-Based Approach to Securities Regulation, COSRA Meeting 
(August 31 – September 2, 2005) available at: 
http://www.supervalores.gov.co/seminarios/RISK%20BASED%20APPROACH%20-OSC.pdf . (Last 
accessed November 27, 2005). 




case is sensible.  However, if factors relating to resources are determinative in declining 
the pursuit of a large number of cases, all else being equal, this may indicate a systemic 
problem in the under-funding of the enforcement division and may suggest that more 
resources should be allocated to the enforcement branch of the regulator. In addition, the 
issue of comparative resources as between the regulator and the respondent, all else being 
equal, may lead to an unfair or disproportionate number of enforcement actions against 
smaller firms as opposed to larger ones.42  
 
Another theme that underlies many of the factors in the OSC’s risk-based 
approach relates to the current divided and overlapping jurisdiction of multiple regulators 
in Canada. For example, if Ontario is not the primary jurisdiction where the misconduct 
took place or harm was felt, or if the misconduct involves potential criminal activity, the 
OSC Staff Notice states that enforcement staff is less likely to take jurisdiction.43 In light 
of the existing structure of enforcement, these considerations as a matter of principle 
appear to be sensible; how they are played out in practice is even more important.  Co-
operation, co-ordination and issues surrounding deferring to other jurisdictions are 
discussed in more detail in Part 6 below. 
 
Another theme that emerges from the OSC’s risk-based enforcement strategy 
relates to the characterization of the regulator’s role as one focused on forward-looking 
behaviour. The Staff Notice states that the “deterrence value of pursuing enforcement 
action” should be considered and the availability of “appropriate alternative remedies” is 
a diminishing factor.44 As explored in Part 2 above, the appropriate issue of the role of 
the regulator appears to be at the heart of the contemporary debate on enforcement and to 
the extent that the securities regulator’s role is re-conceptualized at the margins to have a 
greater focus on compensation for investors, the factors contained in the Staff Notice may 
need to be reassessed and reprioritized. 
 
To the extent that other regulators have not done so, they should be encouraged 
to create, justify and publicly disclose the factors that they take into account in deciding 
whether they pursue enforcement actions.45 This will allow for greater accountability and 
                                                 
42 This is a theoretical assertion that would need to be tested empirically.  In addition to the issue of 
comparative resources, smaller market participants may also not have the capacity or the expertise to 
comply with legal rules, even if they are well intentioned, adding to the argument that they may be unfair 
targets of a risk based regulatory approach. While most large organizations have sophisticated internal 
compliance departments, smaller firms often lack the economies of scale to implement compliance 
programs. While this is outside the scope of an enforcement department of a regulator, regulators should 
help to build capacity in regulated market participants to be able to comply with the relevant legal rules by 
offering or making available the necessary education and assistance.   
43 OECD Report, supra note 1. 
44 Ibid. 
45 IMET also has a risk-based approach to regulation, although it does not appear to publicly disclose the 
relevant factors.  “Any referred case is given a weighted score based upon a set of criteria that ensures that 
the most important cases relating to our investigative mandate receive the attention and resources they 
deserve. Cases with higher scores are more likely to be selected and investigated.” See 
http://www.rcmp.ca/fio/imets-faq_e.htm. (Last accessed November 27, 2005). 
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transparency and better justification as to why a regulator did or did not take enforcement 
action on any particular file.    
 
In addition, regulators should continuously assess current risk factors to ensure 
their relevancy.  While the marketplace is generally a step or two ahead of regulators in 
terms of devising new products, structures and transactions, regulators cannot lag too far 
behind in respect of rule-making or enforcement.  In this regard, the SEC has recently 
created an emerging risks department to remain current on new market products and 
trends and related risks.46  
 
This part of the paper uses the risk-based regulatory approach to analyze some 
important issues related to structuring of discretion and decision-making processes of 
securities regulators. There are other regulatory policies and practices – such as policies 
that credit regulated market participants for self-policing, self-correcting and self-
reporting – that should be examined and analyzed to determine if they are meeting their 
intended policy objectives and whether they are having deleterious effects on regulated 
market participants and/or investors.47   
 
 
6. The Current Regulatory Structure: Issues Arising from Overlapping and 
Concurrent Jurisdiction 
 
Effective enforcement requires significant co-ordination, co-operation and 
harmonization given the significant overlap in the current regulatory structure in Canada.  
The current regulatory structure with multiple securities commissions may increase the 
levels of non-compliance by regulated market participants. It may also impose 
unnecessary costs and/or unfairness on investors and regulated market participants.  In 
this regard, the Wise Persons Committee Report stated: 48
 
We believe that inadequate enforcement is one of the most 
significant weaknesses of the current system. Enforcement 
                                                 
46 See Testimony Concerning SEC's Mutual Fund Oversight Before the U.S. House Subcommittee on 
Commercial and Administrative Law by Lori A. Richards, Director, Office of Compliance Inspections and 
Examinations, U.S. Securities & Exchange Commission. Available at:  
http://www.sec.gov/news/testimony/ts060705lar.htm (Last accessed: November 27, 2005). 
47 For example, it may be appropriate for a regulator to reduce the sanction that would otherwise be 
imposed or apply no sanction at all in the context of regulated market participants who have detected non-
compliance, are willing to disclose it to the regulator and take immediate corrective action. Internal 
compliance systems allow for self-policing, self-correcting and self-reporting can significantly reduce the 
burden on the regulator. If internal detection and reporting to the regulator are not somehow rewarded, then 
regulated market participants are likely to have less of an incentive to expend resources on such programs.  
However, such policies may also be considered to be unfair or coercive in some instances. See OSC Policy 
on Credit for Co-operation at: 
 http://www.osc.gov.on.ca/About/NewsReleases/2002/nr_20020409_osc-hinke.jsp (Last accessed 
November 27, 2005). 
48 It’s Time, WPC Final Report  (December 2003) at 30. Available at: http://www.wise-
averties.ca/finalreport_en.html . (Last accessed November 27, 2005).  
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resources are inefficiently allocated. Coordination 
difficulties can impede investigations and result in a 
multiplicity of proceedings, leading to further inefficiencies 
and potential injustices to respondents. Investor protection 
suffers from a lack of uniformity. There is no legitimate 
reason why investors should have different protection 
depending on the province in which they happen to live. 
 
The current regulatory structure raises a number of important issues in relation 
to regulatory jurisdiction and the appropriate body to engage in any particular 
enforcement activity.  For example, when should one provincial securities commission 
defer to another in terms of an investigation or hearing? When should there be joint 
hearings or investigations? When should the IDA or another SRO engage in enforcement 
activity and when should a securities commission instead pursue the matter? When 
should trading on inside information be labelled criminal and pursued as a charge under 
the Criminal Code and when should it instead be pursued by a securities commission as a 
quasi-criminal offence?   
 
(i) Coordination Costs  
 
There is a relatively high level of co-operation, co-ordination and 
communication amongst the various regulators involved.49 The data show that there are a 
high number of referrals to other entities and concurrent or joint investigations occur 
relatively infrequently.50 For example, the SSC reported that 25% of their investigations 
were referred to an SRO. The OSC referred a total of 31 files to other entities in 2002.  
Twenty-one of those 31 files were referred to another commission. One went to the IDA 
and 9 went to “other” regulatory agencies and law enforcement bodies.51    
 
In terms of concurrent and joint investigations, only 2% of all RS 
investigations were concurrent with the IDA and less than 7% were concurrent with the 
OSC.52 This data suggest less conflict and turf-battling than one might initially think. It 
appears that regulators are willing to give up jurisdiction to another entity that is 
somehow more closely connected, based on issuer location, investor location, or 
expertise.  
  
This general picture of co-operation does not appear to be as true in the context 
of high profile cases, such as Yorkton or Cartaway, where it is less likely that a 
commission or SRO will completely defer to another entity and step out of the matter 
                                                 
49 Charles River Associates, Securities Enforcement in Canada: The Effect of Multiple Regulators, study 
prepared for the Wise Persons’ Committee (December 2003). Available at: http://www.wise-
averties.ca/report_en.html (Last accessed November 27, 2005) [CRA Study]. 
50 Ibid. 




entirely.53  In high profile cases, it is more likely that the regulators will divide up the 
issues or appoint a lead regulator. Regulators may also engage in joint investigations and 
hearings where no lead regulator clearly emerges.  
 
Each of these possibilities increases co-ordination costs and time and expense 
for market participants as well as overall costs for regulators.54 For example, in the 
context of a lead commission, settlement discussions and agreements need not only the 
approval of the lead regulator but all the other regulators who are involved, which may or 
may not be forthcoming. Lawyers representing respondents have to spend additional time 
and resources co-ordinating with the various regulators involved.  Similarly, partitioning 
cases into components among two or more commissions, a stock exchange and/or IDA 
may not always be justified and could be better achieved through one regulator pursuing 
a case.55  
 
The costs of co-ordination as between provincial securities commissions could 
be reduced through a consolidated regulator, as there would no longer be a need to 
appoint a lead regulator or joint matters.  However, co-ordination costs would not be 
entirely eliminated because decisions still need to be made about whether a matter is 
appropriately within the jurisdiction of a securities commission (under a consolidated 
regulator or the current system), an SRO, or criminal law enforcement agencies. Co-
ordination costs in respect of the SROs could be reduced if the IDA, RS and the MFDA 
merge, as was recently tabled for discussion.56  
 
What is becoming even more important than co-ordination and co-operation 
among Canadian regulators is the issue of international co-operation and co-ordination as 
between Canadian regulators and foreign counterparts, particularly U.S. regulators. The 
policy implications of requests for assistance from other foreign jurisdictions as well as 
the technical issues for regulated market participants who are under investigation in 
Canada as well as other jurisdictions internationally should be the subject of further 
study.57  
 
(ii) Effectiveness of Remedies 
 
                                                 
53 Ibid. 
54 Ibid. 
55 Ibid.         
56 Teresa Tedesco, “Mutual fund body rejects link with IDA: 'Not in the public interest'”, Financial Post, 
November 16, 2005. 
57 See, for example, David Brown, The 3 Cs for Improving Securities Law Enforcement: Coordination, 
Cooperation and Communication, Financial Services & Public Policy Conference, Schulich School of 
Business, York University, April 23, 2004. Available at 
http://www.osc.gov.on.ca/About/Speeches/sp_20040423_db-3cs-security-law.jsp. (Last accessed 
November 27, 2005). 
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The range of sanctions and the maximum fines vary from province to province, 
which creates unfairness for both investors and respondents,58 but equally as significant 
is that a sanction ordered by a provincial securities commission is only effective in the 
province in which it was ordered. For example, assume that the ASC takes jurisdiction 
over a particular matter of misconduct and no other commission does.  Assume also that 
the sanction ordered under the regulator’s public interest power is a ban on being a 
director or officer of a company for 10 years. Under the current system, there is nothing 
to prevent the sanctioned individual from going to BC or Ontario and becoming a director 
or officer of a public company there.  This is extremely problematic from an enforcement 
policy perspective, particularly in the context of investor protection.  If a regulator has 
decided that it is not in the public interest that an individual who has engaged in 
misconduct be a director or officer in Alberta, for the benefit of Alberta investors and 
residents, other Canadian investors should have the benefit of the same protection.  
 
(iii) Differences in Enforcement Policies and Priorities  
 
a. Actual Differences in Types of Cases that Get Pursued 
 
There are significant differences amongst the commissions in respect of the 
types of cases that get pursued for enforcement as well as the factors that are considered 
relevant in sanctioning. There are also significant differences in enforcement trends 
among commissions.  The OSC, for example, is focused on registrant-related misconduct, 
while B.C. has focused its enforcement efforts on the distribution of securities without a 
prospectus.59  
 
What types of cases get pursued for enforcement is an important and 
interesting issue. In part, it is the result of the types of complaints received from the 
public and referrals made by other regulators. In part, it is a top-down exercise of priority 
setting by the relevant commission. For example, the Ontario Commission has made the 
prosecution of insider trading cases a priority.60 It may also be related to perceptions 
about the different nature of the local markets across the country.  There is a perception 
that the BC market is different than the Ontario market.  The perception is that BC is 
dominated by promoters and junior resource companies attempting to raise financing and, 
as a result, the regulator may be pressured to focus enforcement activities on misconduct 
in this sphere.61  Alternatively, it may be that the OSC takes jurisdiction over most of the 
                                                 
58 Mary Condon, The Use of Public Interest Enforcement Orders by Securities Regulators in Canada (WPC 
Research Study 2003) Available at: http://www.wise-averties.ca/report_en.html (Last accessed November 
27, 2005) [Condon Study].  
59 Ibid. 
60 David Brown, The 3 Cs for Improving Securities Law Enforcement: Coordination, Cooperation and 
Communication, Financial Services & Public Policy Conference, Schulich School of Business, York 
University, April 23, 2004. Available at http://www.osc.gov.on.ca/About/Speeches/sp_20040423_db-3cs-
security-law.jsp (Last accessed November 27, 2005). 
61 See Condon Study, supra note 58. See also, Poonam Puri, Local and Regional Interests in the Debate on 
Optimal Securities Regulatory Structure (WPC Research Study 2003) Available at: http://www.wise-
averties.ca/report_en.html. (Last accessed November 27, 2005). 
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nationally regulated market participants, and as a result, other provincial commissions 
then take on enforcement matters that are more local in nature or intra-provincial. While 
this last factor in particular may help to shed some light on the differences in enforcement 
trends across the country, it also highlights that the combined enforcement actions of 
multiple provincial regulators may lead to sub-optimal enforcement in contrast to a 
national or consolidated regulator which could pursue an enforcement agenda that would 
better reflect the national interest.  
 
b. Local Differences in Sanctioning Principles 
 
The provincial commissions also appear to have different approaches regarding 
the factors that are relevant to sentencing. One issue is whether the consequences to the 
respondent of the proposed sanction and its quantum should be taken into account.62 
Some commissions, such as the ASC, have taken the position that this factor should not 
be taken into consideration in sanctioning. Other commissions, such as Saskatchewan, 
Manitoba, Ontario and New Brunswick, have indicated that they are willing to consider 
and give some weight to the impact on the respondent in choosing the sanction and 
setting the quantum.63 The BCSC has decisions that go both ways.64
 
If the focus is on general deterrence as the primary goal of enforcement, one 
could make the argument that little or no weight should be given to the respondent’s 
particular circumstances. However, to the extent that we are also interested in specific 
deterrence and changing the future behaviour of the particular person that is being 
sanctioned, it is entirely reasonable to consider the impact on the respondent, particularly 
where it may create unfairness or undue hardship. The relevance of this factor may also 
differ depending on whether the respondent is an individual or a corporation.  While a 
thorough analysis on this issue is beyond the scope of this paper, and reasonable people 
may disagree on whether this factor should weigh into a sentencing decision, this is an 
important policy issue on which there should be greater certainty, clarity and consistency 
for respondents. More generally, CSA members should agree on a set of sanctioning 
principles and guidelines. 
  
7. Measuring and Comparing Enforcement Effectiveness  
 
(i) Canadian Data on Enforcement Activity and Outcomes 
 
Most securities regulatory bodies collect data that measure their enforcement 
activity by way of inputs such as enforcement budgets and enforcement staff and outputs 
such as number of cases opened and closed, number of active files, time to complete 
                                                 
62 Condon Study, supra note 58. 




investigations or hearings,65 and sanctions imposed. These data are relatively easy to 
collect and measure.  
 
Recently, Canadian securities regulatory bodies have been making much more 
of an effort to communicate such information to the public. For example, the CSA 
released its first Report on Enforcement Activity (from April 1 to September 30, 2004) 
highlighting that during the first six months of 2004, CSA members commenced 77 
enforcement matters; fifty-nine cases resulted in sanctioning orders or settlements during 
that time period.66  In its second report on enforcement (from October 1, 2004 to March 
31, 2005), the CSA reports that members commenced 65 new proceedings and settled or 
ordered sanctions in 88 matters.67  The CSA reports also contain data about the 
enforcement activities of the SROs.  
 
On the issue of enforcement budgets, in 2002 Ontario’s enforcement budget 
was just over $9 million, with Quebec following at $4.4, B.C. at $3.5 and Alberta at 
$3.1.68 Examining enforcement budgets as a percentage of total budgets, the 
commissions spend between 10 to 20% of their total budgets on enforcement.69 It is 
noteworthy that Ontario and Quebec have significantly increased their enforcement 
resources, as measured by the number of enforcement staff.70 The OSC has more than 
doubled its enforcement staff (from 38 in 1998 to over 90 in 2005).71 Even though the 
OSC has increased its resources, the number of hearings does not appear to have 
increased over this time period; in fact, it appears that the number of hearings has stayed 
consistent at around 30 between 2002 and 2005.72 This suggests that the OSC is 
deploying additional resources per file pursued, keeping the number of files constant, as 
opposed to using the additional resources to increase volume by opening new files.  
 
While it is extremely important that regulatory agencies communicate their 
enforcement activities and data to the public, the data that is currently collected and 
released is insufficient to draw complete and meaningful conclusions about the 
effectiveness of enforcement activities and programs undertaken by regulators.73   
 
                                                 
65 See for example Notes for remarks by David A. Brown, “A Cooperative Approach to Fighting Economic 
Crime” PriceWaterhouseCooopers May 27, 2004 at 6.  
66 Canadian Securities Administrators, Report on Enforcement Activities from April 1, 2004 to September 
31, 2004. Available at: http://www.csa-acvm.ca/pdfs/Enforcement2004_Eng.pdf (Last accessed November 
27, 2005). 
67 Canadian Securities Administrators, Report on Enforcement Activities from October 1, 2004 to March 
31, 2005. Available at: http://www.csa-acvm.ca/pdfs/Enforcement-Report_Oct-Mar2005_Eng.pdf (Last 
accessed November 27, 2005). 
68 CRA Study, supra note 49, Table 3.   
69 Ibid.  
70 Ibid.   
71 Ontario Securities Commission 2005 Annual Report at 3. Available at: 
http://www.osc.gov.on.ca/About/AnnualRpt/rpt_2005-osc-en.pdf . (Last accessed November 27, 2005) 
72 Ibid at 6. 
73 OECD Report, supra note 1. 
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If more cases are opened, closed, or settled over previous years, is enforcement 
any more effective? It may be that simpler or more complex matters were taken on. If 
fines imposed are higher than in previous years, is enforcement more effective? If a 
larger number of insider trading cases are opened in any particular year, does it 
necessarily mean that more improper insider trading was taking place in the capital 
markets, or does it reflect a policy priority of a securities commission to focus its 
enforcement resources on this particular offence? 
 
Given that a central goal of enforcement activity is deterrence, the most useful 
data to assess the effectiveness of enforcement activity has to do with its impact on the 
actual behaviour of regulated market participants.  Did the enforcement activities actually 
have a discernable impact on the behaviour of regulated market participants and the 
underlying policy objectives of securities regulation?  It is acknowledged that these data 
are more difficult to collect, measure and analyze but greater attempts should be made by 
regulators to do so.74  
 
(ii) Comparative Enforcement Activity and Effectiveness   
 
When discussing issues of enforcement, the assertion is inevitably made that 
Canada does not engage in enough enforcement activity relative to the U.S. and that 
Canadian regulators are less effective at enforcement.   For example, the Wise Persons 
Committee reported: “There is a widely held view that enforcement in Canada is lax in 
comparison with the United States and other countries.”75  David Dodge, the Governor of 
the Bank of Canada, also made a bold statement in late 2004 about the Canadian state of 
enforcement:76
  
This is a very common refrain we hear when we visit markets in New 
York or in Boston or in London or in Europe, a perception that, somehow, 
this is kind of a little bit more of a Wild West up here in terms of the 
degree in which rules and regulations are enforced -- and that perception 
doesn't really help us when we go to try to raise money on foreign 
markets. 
 
Investor perceptions about relative enforcement effectiveness are important and 
needs to be addressed, particularly in light of the increased mobility of capital in today’s 
global economy.  However, care needs to be taken to ensure that we are cognizant of 
structural, legal and practical differences between jurisdictions and differences in 
regulatory authority amongst regulators that may account for different levels of 
enforcement activity.  
 
                                                 
74 See also CRA Study, supra note 49 at  footnote 12. 
75 Supra note 48. 
76 “Canada like 'Wild West': Dodge: Calls for crime crackdown, ruling on bank mergers” National Post, 
December 10, 2004.   
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In comparing U.S. data with Canadian data, Canadian commissions devote a 
smaller percentage of their total budget to enforcement than comparable U.S. 
commissions.77 The CRA study commissioned for the Wise Persons Committee found 
that the U.S. SEC’s enforcement budget is 29% of its total budget while enforcement 
accounts for between 13% and 19% of the budgets of the commissions in BC, Alberta, 
Quebec and Ontario.78  
 
This comparison begs the question of the relationship between enforcement 
effectiveness and resources. Certainly no resources dedicated to enforcement means no 
enforcement activity can take place, but does doubling enforcement resources or 
increasing the percentage of a commission’s total budget mean that enforcement will be 
more effective?  The relationship between resources and enforcement effectiveness is not 
linear, but certainly more resources can allow for either a greater volume of cases to be 
pursued and/or for additional resources to be devoted to each file.  
 
In comparing enforcement budgets, one also needs to take into account a 
holistic picture of the reasons for non-compliance by regulated market participants. 
Resources in a commission need to be divided up between policy-making, enforcement 
and various other departments.  As between two regulators, it may be that the similar 
level of compliance can be achieved by a different allocation of resources between 
various departments. For example, one regulator may devote more resources to policy-
making by spending more time and effort at the rule design stage, with more extensive 
consultations with stakeholders, and with greater analysis and thought about the 
appropriate form and tools of regulation; another commission may spend proportionately 
less resources at the rule design stage and expend much greater resources at the later 
stage of enforcement to ensure compliance with the rules. However, the level of 
compliance with the legal rules by market participants regulated by both regulators may 
end up being similar.  
 
Comparisons are also frequently made on the quantum of monetary penalties 
imposed by Canadian regulators compared to U.S. regulators. Canadian regulators are 
criticized that the level of fines imposed on wrongdoers are substantially less than by the 
U.S. SEC. The CRA study found that fines and administrative penalties are actually 
comparable between Canada and the U.S. securities regulators.79 However, total 
monetary penalties are higher in the U.S. than in Canada.  In particular, “U.S. monetary 
penalties are ten times larger than average Canadian penalties, per Canadian $10 billion 
GDP” when account is taken of SEC civil penalties and disgorgements of illegal profits 
along with U.S. state restitution.80  It also found that total penalties are higher in the U.S. 
as a result of large restitution powers.81  
 
                                                 
77 CRA Study, supra note 49.  
78 See Wise Persons Committee Report, supra note 48 at 27. See also CRA Study, supra note 49. 
79 CRA Study, supra note 49 at Table 8.  
80 Ibid.   
81 CRA Study, supra note 49 at Table 8.  
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Do these data indicate that enforcement is more lax in Canada than the U.S.? 
There are several factors that need to be taken into account in comparing the data.  First, 
some Canadian commissions do not have the full range of remedies that are available to 
the SEC. Many Canadian securities commissions do not have powers of restitution, 
disgorgement, or administrative sanctions.82  Second, the maximum administrative 
penalty that can be imposed by Canadian commissions that do have such power varies 
significantly from a low of $100,000 in Saskatchewan and Nova Scotia to a high of $5 
million in Manitoba for corporations.83  Third, some Canadian securities commissions 
were only recently granted additional statutory authority in respect of the types of powers 
they have and the orders they can make and so there is likely to be lag in respect of actual 
usage.84  
 
Another significant difference in enforcement policy and practice between U.S. 
and Canadian regulators is that to settle matters, the SEC does not currently require an 
admission of guilt whereas Canadian regulators do.  Under the U.S. system, respondents 
can settle but “neither admit nor deny” the relevant charges. All else being equal, this 
policy certainly increases the willingness of respondents to settle in the U.S. context and 
also favourably impacts – at least in terms of perceptions – the number of successful 
cases settled by the SEC.  However, it is questionable as to whether such a policy actually 
achieves the underlying goals of enforcement, in particular behaviour modification of 
regulated market participants. As such, it is not advisable in my view for Canadian 
regulators to consider such a policy change solely in the interests of increasing the 
volume of “successful” settlements.   Similarly, the frequent use of the “perp walk” in the 
U.S. is a practice that has been much less common in Canada and should not necessarily 
be encouraged.  Finally, a number of the high profile cases in the U.S. that have caught 
the attention of the Canadian press and the Canadian public have not been pursued by the 
SEC but under the criminal law powers by the state Attorneys-General, most notably 
Eliot Spitzer.  
 
The significant differences in statutory authority afforded to the different 
securities commissions highlighted above, as well as practical differences in the handling 
of cases, limits the extent to which complete and meaningful comparisons can be made 
between Canada and the U.S. securities regulators. To the extent that there are justifiable 
policy differences and approaches between Canada and the U.S., regulated market 
participants, investors and the general public should be made aware of them.  
 
(iii) Canadian Regulatory Autonomy and Independence: Defer to the SEC for 
Canadian Inter-Listed Companies? 
 
Warren Grover recently suggested that Canadian securities regulators should 
focus their enforcement activities on the sub-set of Canadian companies with no U.S. or 
international presence and allow the SEC to monitor and engage in enforcement against 
                                                 





Canadian inter-listed companies.85 While this proposed approach would free up 
enforcement resources for Canadian regulators, I believe it is misguided. It would 
exclude from Canadian regulatory oversight large public companies – such as Nortel and 
Hollinger - in which many Canadian public investors have significant investments.  
While I appreciate that there is much functional convergence of securities law rules based 
on the rule making or enforcement actions taken by the SEC, the proposed approach 
would also undermine the regulatory independence and autonomy of Canadian 
regulators.  On a more practical matter, there is the issue of jurisdictional reach and the 
impact of the sanctions imposed by the SEC.  The SEC can sanction Canadian inter-listed 
companies but the sanctions are only effective in the U.S. and would not prevent the 
wrongdoers from engaging in the sanctioned conduct in Canada without some sort of 




This study analyzed key issues related to enforcement effectiveness in the 
Canadian capital markets, and found that the effectiveness of regulatory enforcement by 
public regulators must be considered in the context of a comprehensive enforcement 
strategy which includes private enforcement mechanisms as well as investor education 
programs. 
 
The study found that the time might be ripe to re-conceive of the role of the 
securities regulator in the 21st century as one that, in addition to taking enforcement 
actions on the basis of the principle of deterrence, also acts as a catalyst or facilitator to 
assist investors in receiving compensation for harms suffered. 
 
The threat of a criminal prosecution can act as a real and significant deterrent 
to regulated market participants. It recommended that Criminal Code prosecutions be 
reserved for the most egregious cases of capital markets misconduct. The IMET strategy 
of expending significant resources on a very small number of investigations is reasonable 
in this context. The role of judges is critical in the criminal law process and to ensure that 
the goals underlying the creation of IMET come to fruition, judges should be provided 
with greater context-training and education on the harms caused by corporate and white 
collar crime. Serious consideration should also be given to the creation of specialized 
courts for capital markets misconduct.  
 
Securities regulators need to structure the broad discretion that has been 
afforded to them so that they have a principled, rational and justifiable basis on which to 
pursue their enforcement agendas and activities. To the extent that some Canadian 
securities regulators have not done so already, they should be encouraged to create, 
justify and publicly disclose the factors that they take into account in deciding whether to 
pursue enforcement actions.  
 
                                                 
85 Warren Grover, Corporate Governance of Greed, Falconbridge Lecture in Commercial Law, Osgoode 
Hall Law School (October 2004, on file with author). 
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Effective enforcement requires a high-level of co-operation, co-ordination and 
communication among Canadian securities regulators. The current regulatory structure 
would benefit from greater co-ordination and co-operation in relation to enforcement 
policy setting and priority-setting.  A system should be devised to recognize sanctions 
imposed by one securities commission in other Canadian jurisdictions. Attention should 
also be paid to technical and policy issues related to co-operation and co-ordination with 
foreign counterparts, particularly regulators in the U.S. 
  
While Canadian securities regulators should continue to collect and 
disseminate basic data on enforcement activities, greater effort should be made to analyze 
the impact of enforcement inputs and outputs on the actual behaviour of regulated market 
participants.  Investor perceptions about Canada’s enforcement effectiveness relative to 
other jurisdictions, in particular the U.S., are important and need to be addressed, 
particularly in light of the increased mobility of capital in today’s global economy. In 
comparing Canadian and U.S. data on enforcement, one needs to be cognizant of 
differences in statutory authority afforded to the securities regulators as well as practical 
differences in the handling of cases. Canadian securities regulators should educate 
investors, the press and the public about these differences but at the same time consider 
adopting best practices and policies from other jurisdictions to the extent that they may 
enhance enforcement effectiveness in the Canadian capital markets.  
  
 
 28
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 29
